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CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION:




In January 2003, in Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal
Commission, the California Court of Appeals ruled that the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission’s appointment structure violates the Califor-
nia state constitution’s separation of powers clause.1 The plaintiff,
Marine Forests Society (MFS), had built an experimental reef on the
floor of the Newport Harbor. The California Coastal Commission
(hereinafter “Commission”) notified the MFS that it intended to
commence cease and desist proceedings against it. The MFS brought
suit to enjoin the Commission, arguing that the Commission’s ap-
pointment structure was unconstitutional and therefore, that the
Commission did not have the authority to issue the order.2 The ap-
pellate court agreed with the MFS. On April 9, 2003, the Supreme
Court of California agreed to review this case.3 If the California Su-
preme Court upholds the ruling of unconstitutionality, it will then
have to decide whether such a ruling will retroactively invalidate past
and pending decisions of the Commission.4 Such a retroactive applica-
tion of a ruling of unconstitutionality would cause uncertainty and
disarray for cities and property owners who have relied on Commis-
sion decisions over the past twenty-seven years.
*  Joint degree student at Duke Law School and Duke's School of Law and Nicholas
School of the Environment. She would like to thank Professor Christopher Schroeder for his
helpful comments, and Charlotte Mitchell for her incisive editing.
1. Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1232 (2002).
2. Id. at 1236.
3. Supreme Court of California Docket No. S113466, at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.
ca.gov (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
4. Id. ("[T]he court requested additional briefing on the following [issue]: . . . What effect
would the holding of the Court of Appeal have on past and other currently pending decisions of
the California Coastal Commission?").
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The doctrine of retroactivity has gone through various incarna-
tions at both the state and the federal levels over the past two hun-
dred years, so it is not obvious which approach the court will use in
this case. In addition to having a choice of approaches to retroactivity
of judicial decisions, the court could choose to use the de facto officer
doctrine and uphold past decisions of commissioners because they
were de facto officers at the time they made the decisions. The pur-
pose of this Note is to navigate the case law from California courts
and from the United States Supreme Court in an attempt to deter-
mine whether the California Supreme Court will make retroactive a
ruling of unconstitutionality in the MFS case.
This Note will first give a brief background on the Commission
and the MFS case. It will then examine the history of the retroactivity
and de facto officer doctrines at both the United States and California
Supreme Court levels. Given the existing history of retroactivity, the
Note will then explore the factors that the California Supreme Court
will consider in reaching a decision, and the limiting effect of res judi-
cata and statutes of limitations on retroactive decisions. Finally, the
Note will examine whether the court would use the de facto officer.
This Note concludes that if the California Supreme Court upholds the
ruling of unconstitutionality, it will not invoke the de facto officer
doctrine, but will choose instead to make its decision non-retroactive.
II.  BACKGROUND
A. California Coastal Commission: History, Number and Importance
of Decisions
The California Coastal Commission was first created by voter
initiative in 19725 and later made permanent by the California Coastal
Act of 1976.6 The Commission’s duties include reviewing and certify-
ing the programs of local governments for compliance with the
Coastal Act, granting and denying permits for development, requiring
property owners to offer easements for public beach access, and is-
suing cease and desist orders.7 In its twenty-seven years, the Commis-
sion has made over 100,000 decisions relating to development per-
5. Proposition 20; see California Coastal Commission website, at http://www.coastal.
ca.gov/whoweare.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003) (describing the history and mission of the
California Coastal Commission).
6. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30300 (1996).
7. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 30510-30514, 30600, 30601-30627, 30809-30811 (1996).
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mits.8 As of October 1, 2003, there were twenty-three appeals of
Commission decisions pending review in trial and appellate courts in
California.9 Several of the cases pending before the trial courts were
brought after the appellate court’s decision in Marine Forests Society
but involve appeals of offers to dedicate that were finalized many
years ago.10 These decisions will be blocked by the Coastal Act’s stat-
ute of limitations. Only two cases currently pending reached the ap-
peals court before Marine Forests Society was decided.11
B. The Ruling: Separation of Powers under the California
Constitution
The California state constitution establishes that “[t]he powers of
the state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the
others.”12 Recognizing that the purpose of this doctrine is to diffuse
power amongst the three branches and prevent any one branch from
aggrandizing too much power, the court has “struck down provisions
of law that either accrete power to a single branch” or that “under-
mine the authority and independence of one” of the branches.”13
In Marine Forests Society, the court of appeals held that the
Commission’s appointment structure violated the separation of pow-
ers doctrine because it put an agency of the executive branch under
“the control of the Legislature.”14 The legislature had nearly unfet-
tered power to appoint eight out of twelve of the Commission’s
members; the legislature had completely unfettered power to remove
a majority of members; 15 and there were “no safeguards or checks” to
8. Br. for Pet'r at 58, Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. S113466 (Cal.
filed April 9, 2003).
9. Telephone Interview with Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Att'y Gen. for California (Sep. 15,
2003); Com. Note for Judicial Record Ex. A, Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No.
S113466 (Cal. filed April 9, 2003).
10. See e.g. Balkanski v. State Coastal Conservancy, Monterey Superior Court No. M59080
(offer to dedicate made in 1980); see also Rubinroit v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, Los Angeles
County Superior Court No. BC279373 (offer to dedicate made in 1988).
11. See e.g. Encinitas Country Day Sch. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 4th District Court of Ap-
peal, Division 1, No. D038323; Harvey v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 1st District Court of Appeal,
Division 2, Nos. A100063, A100656.
12. CAL. CONST., Article III, §3.
13. Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1240 (2002)
(quoting Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State 25 Cal. 4th 287, 297 (2001)).
14. Id. at 1246.
15. Id. at 1246; Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30312(a) (prior to Feb 20, 2003).
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ensure the Commission’s fidelity to the executive branch.16 All of this
added up to the Legislature’s having “excessive control” over the
Commission, and resulted in the Commission’s “improper subservi-
ence to the legislative branch.”17 The court of appeals therefore con-
cluded that the Commission’s appointment structure “materially in-
fringes upon the inherent authority . . . and independence of the
agency.”18
Balancing the power of the three branches of government is a
fundamental tenet of our federal Constitution as well as of the Cali-
fornia constitution. In the case of the Commission, the separation of
powers violation would give the legislature the power not only to de-
clare the law, but also to enact and to enforce it through the Commis-
sion’s quasi-judicial functions.19 This would allow the Legislature to
inappropriately usurp the executive branch’s power.
C. The Fix: Assembly Bill 1X
On February 20, 2003, less than two months after the court of
appeals’ ruling in Marine Forests Society, the governor of California
signed a bill to fix the Commission’s appointment structure so that it
would no longer violate the separation of powers doctrine.20 Assembly
Bill 1X, which took effect on May 22, 2003, eliminates the Legisla-
ture’s power to remove Commissioners and instead imposes a four-
year term limit on Commission members.21
Nevertheless, this change addresses just one of the three prob-
lems that the court of appeals identified. The legislature still has the
power to appoint a majority of members, and there are no safeguards
to ensure the Commission’s fidelity to the executive branch. The lan-
guage of the court of appeals’ ruling made it clear that it was imper-
missible to have all three of the violations it noted22 but did not clarify
16. Marine Forests Soc'y, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1248, 1252 (stating that the legislature had,
"virtually unfettered authority over the appointment of a majority of the Commission's mem-
bers, and wholly unfettered power to remove those members at the will of the Legislature").
17. Id. at 1248.
18. Id. at 1245.
19. Marine Forests Soc'y v. California Coastal Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1241
(2002).
20. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30312(a)(2) (1996); see also Bill Number ABX2 1 at California
Bill Information, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
21. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30312(a) (1996) ("A person appointed by the Senate Committee
on Rules or by the Speaker of the Assembly and qualified for membership because he or she
holds a specified office as a locally elected official shall serve a term of four years.").
22. Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1252 (2002).
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whether it would be permissible to have just two. The Supreme Court
of California has agreed to address the issue of whether this change in
appointment structure rectifies the breach of the separation of powers
doctrine23 and thus will determine whether Commission decisions
made after May 22, 2003 are valid. Whether or not the court decides
that the Commission’s structure is valid in the future, the court will
have to decide whether the Commission’s past decisions are still valid.
III.  RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
Generally, judicial decisions are retroactive and legislative deci-
sions are non-retroactive.24 The rationale behind this dichotomy is
that judicial decisions are declaring an absolute and unchanging law,
while the legislature is constantly reacting to a changing society. The
legislature reacts to temporal changes but the law transcends time.
Despite this general rule, courts have recognized, as the legislature
does, that sometimes the law changes with the times. When a new ju-
dicial decision overrules a previous rule on which the public has re-
lied, it is unfair to treat that the new rule as if it had always been the
law. This recognition of the potential unfairness of retroactivity has
caused both federal and California courts to allow exceptions to the
general rule of retroactivity. Nevertheless, different courts have come
up with different methods of deciding whether an exception is appro-
priate in a particular case. This inconsistent treatment makes it diffi-
cult to predict when a court will apply a decision retroactively and
when it will not.
B. Options in Retroactive Application
Not only is it difficult to determine whether a court will make its
decision retroactive, but there are even more intricate application op-
tions. A court might decide to make a decision applicable under vari-
ous schemes, those being: (1) only cases on pending review; (2) ex-
23. Supreme Court grant of permission to review, in docket entries for docket #S113466, at
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (last visited Sep. 15, 2003) ("Does the February 20, 2003
amendment to Public Resources Code section 30312 eliminate the separation-of-powers defect
found by the Court of Appeals, or is the composition of the California Coastal Commission still
vulnerable to a separation-of-powers challenge?").
24. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("The principle that
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar
to every law student.") (citations omitted).
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clude cases in which the trial has already started; or (3) applicable
only to the parties before the court and not to other past actions. Be-
low is a summary of the different ways that courts might apply a new
decision.
1. Common Law Retroactivity.
Common law retroactivity completely erased the former state of
the law and replaced it with the new rule. All past actions could be
relitigated under the new rule. All decisions made under the previous
rule, whether made by a court or by a commissioner, were treated as
nonexistent.25
In Marine Forests Society, common law retroactivity would mean
that all decisions made by the Commission in the past twenty-seven
years would officially never have happened. All permits conveyed
would be null and void. People who had developed their property
pursuant to Commission permits would no longer have the permis-
sion thus granted. Commission-acquired easements for public beach
access would cease to exist. No city plans approved by the Commis-
sion would retain approval. All of these parties would have to appeal
to the new Commission or to some other government body to re-
determine their rights.
2. Modern Retroactivity.
Most recent Supreme Court cases assume that a retroactive deci-
sion applies only to past actions that are not blocked from appeal by
res judicata or statute of limitations. A new judicial rule applies to fu-
ture actions, to the case before the court when it makes its ruling, to
all cases still pending, and to all other past actions that have neither
exceeded the applicable statute of limitations nor received a final de-
cision. The Supreme Court takes as given that decisions blocked from
appeal by res judicata will still be blocked even if a new decision is
applied retroactively.26
In Marine Forests Society, modern retroactivity would mean that
all Commission decisions that have already been challenged and re-
ceived a final judgment in court could not be reappealed under a
separation of powers claim. In addition, any final Commission deci-
25. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
26. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S 529, 541 (1991) (holding that "once
suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new rule cannot reopen the
door already closed").
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sions that were not appealed within the sixty-day statute of limitations
could not be challenged under a separation of powers claim.
3. Limited Retroactivity.
California courts have sometimes found that some cases call for
specially tailored retroactivity.27 The court makes a special delineation
regarding which past actions should be decided under the old rule and
which under the new rule. In one case in which there were many cases
on the same issue already on trial, the court ruled that its decision
should apply only to those cases in which trial had not yet begun.28 In
another case involving conversion of wetlands, the court held that its
new decision should only apply to properties that were still recover-
able.29 In formulating special limited retroactivity for the MFS case,
the court might decide that all Commission decisions which are final
but not yet acted upon are eligible for appeal.
4. Non-retroactivity: Selective Prospectivity.
Selective or modified prospectivity applies a new judicial rule to
the parties before the court and to all future claims. This means that
the past action before the court is the only past action that will be
subject to the new rule. All other past actions, including those still
pending on review, must be decided pursuant to the old rule. The
United States Supreme Court criticized this approach for not treating
similarly situated parties similarly.30 The Court then rejected selective
prospectivity as an option at the federal level holding that once a de-
cision has been applied to the parties before the court, that decision
must be applied to all similarly situated parties.31
In Marine Forests Society, the court of appeals has already ap-
plied its decision to the Marine Forests Society. The United States
Supreme Court would hold that this ruling necessitates retroactivity.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court does not have to follow
27. Li v. Yellow Cab Co, 13 Cal. 3d 804 (1975); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.
3d 515 (1980).
28. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 829.
29. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 533-534.
30. Harvey v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (stating, "selective
application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated parties the same"
(quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)).
31. James B. Beam Distilling v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540-44 (1991) (holding that "it is
error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has
already done so. . . Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is cho-
sen for all others who might seek its prospective application. . . . When the Court has applied a
rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others.").
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federal precedent, so it could still choose to utilize selective prospec-
tivity. This would allow the California Supreme Court to apply a deci-
sion of unconstitutionality to the MFS and to any claimants from fu-
ture decisions of the Commission, but not to any other parties to past
actions of the Commission.
5. Non-retroactivity: Pure Prospectivity.
Pure prospectivity applies a new judicial rule only to claims aris-
ing after the court’s ruling is made final. All actions that occurred be-
fore the ruling, including claims pending on review and the claim be-
fore the court, must be decided under the old rule. This approach
assumes that the previous rule was the legal reality until the new judi-
cial decision changed that reality. Consequently, all decisions made
under the previous rule were legal at the relevant time and continue
to be so.
The de facto officer doctrine is a form of prospectivity; it gives
validity to the decisions made by an officer even when a court later
finds a legal defect with that officer. Like non-retroactivity, this doc-
trine seeks to maintain stability by not disrupting a status quo that
was accepted and relied upon. The doctrine applies mainly to cases
where an officer’s defect was “technical” 32 and caused no substantive
harm to those who relied on his or her decisions.
In Marine Forests Society, prospective application of a ruling of
unconstitutionality would mean that only Commission decisions made
after the California Supreme Court’s ruling could be challenged on a
separation of powers basis. No past decisions could be challenged.
Similarly, the de facto officer doctrine would validate all past Com-
mission decisions up until the date of the California Supreme Court
ruling and protect them from collateral attack on separation of pow-
ers grounds. If the court holds that the Commission’s new appoint-
ment structure, as created by AB 1X, passes separation of powers
muster, then no Commission decision would be challenged because
AB 1X took effect on May 22, 2003 and thus all Commission deci-
sions since that date would be valid.
As discussed in the “Modern Retroactivity” part above, retroac-
tive decisions are typically limited by res judicata and applicable stat-
utes of limitations. The “History” part below broadly discusses retro-
activity and non-retroactivity, leaving res judicata and statutes of
limitations to be discussed in a later section. For the purposes of this
32. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995) (quoting 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Pub. Officers
and Employees § 578 (1984)).
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Note, a retroactive decision is one that applies to past actions, in-
cluding past actions still pending on review at the time of the decision.
A non-retroactive decision is one that does not apply to past actions,
including those pending on review and the one immediately before
the court.
C. History of Retroactivity in the United States and California
Supreme Courts
Under common law, all judicial decisions were given full retroac-
tive effect.33 The philosophic justification for this tradition was the
belief that the law is an absolute truth and exists independently of
mere mortals’ interpretation of it; when a court makes a decision, it is
not creating the law, but discovering the true law as it has always
been. 34 This “declarative” theory was most famously expressed by
Blackstone, who said that the duty of the court is not to “pronounce a
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.”35 Justice Cardozo
explained that this “ancient dogma” means that an overturned rule
will be viewed as never having existed, and the new rule will be as-
sumed to have been the law all along. 36 The United States Supreme
Court has slowly, but not steadily, moved away from this common law
retroactivity. For the past decade the Court has supported the mod-
ern view of retroactivity, applying its decisions to past actions as long
as they are not blocked by res judicata or statutes of limitations. The
California Supreme Court has also had an uneven history regarding
retroactivity, but has leaned generally toward non-retroactive applica-
tion.
The United States Supreme Court made its most famous state-
ment of the common law retroactivity doctrine in the 1886 case of
Norton v. Shelby County.37 There, it held that “[a]n unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inop-
33. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965) (stating, "[a]t common law there was no
authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future. . . . 'Judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.'" (quoting Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.)).
34. See John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 222 (1st ed. 1909).
35. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69.
36. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932)
(holding, "a discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered
declaration as law from the beginning.").
37. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
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erative as though it had never been passed.”38 In other words, an un-
constitutional statute was never a statute at all.
Interestingly, this very case, which is often cited as expressing the
unforgiving common law rule of complete retroactivity, was also one
of the first to delineate an exception to that rule in the form of the de
facto officer doctrine. The de facto officer doctrine gives validity to
the acts of officers holding a legal office, no matter what “defects
there may be in the legality of their appointment or election.”39 The
doctrine upholds all past decisions of an officer who seemed to be a
legally sanctioned officer at the time, even though a later judicial rul-
ing holds that he or she did not have the legal authority to make those
decisions.40
The purpose of the de facto officer doctrine is to maintain the
stability and authority of the government.41 Revoking official deci-
sions at a later date because of a “technical”42 problem with an offi-
cer’s appointment would create confusion and hardship for those who
had relied upon that decision. Additionally, if every citizen who was
unhappy with an official decision could collaterally attack the officer’s
right to office, chaos might result. 43 The de facto officer doctrine is
thus “founded upon considerations of policy and necessity, for the
protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be af-
fected thereby.”44
Although the United States Supreme Court explained the pur-
pose of the de facto officer doctrine in Norton, it held that the doc-
trine did not apply in that case. The county court had created a board
of commissioners, and the board had then undertaken official acts
such as issuing bonds. The Supreme Court decided that the county
court did not have the authority to create the board of commissioners,
so the board had, in essence, never been created. Rather than using
the de facto officer doctrine to accord validity to the acts of the com-
missioners, the court reasoned that “the act attempting to create the
office of commissioner never became a law, the office never came
into existence” and “there can be no officer . . . if there be no office to
38. Id.
39. Id. at 441.
40. Id. at 441-44 (explaining that if an officer "is clothed with the insignia of the office,"
then his or her "authority is to be respected and obeyed").
41. See Kathryn A. Clokey, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued Appli-
cation, 85 COLUM. L. REV 1121, 1131 (1985).
42. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995).
43. Id. (explaining that this would disturb the "orderly functioning of the government.").
44. Id.
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fill.”45 The de facto officer doctrine only applies when the office itself
is legal, and the defect is with the officer. If the office itself is uncon-
stitutional, the de facto officer doctrine is irrelevant. The Court rec-
ognized the necessity for an exception to common law retroactivity,
but ultimately relied on Blackstone’s belief in absolute legal truth.
While the United States Supreme Court was just beginning to en-
tertain the idea that reliance interests are real even when a statute or
an office theoretically is not, the California Supreme Court was facing
the issue squarely. In 1898, twelve years after the United States Su-
preme Court’s strong statement of common law retroactivity in Nor-
ton, the California Supreme Court made an equally strong statement
in favor of non-retroactivity. After holding that a law setting the sala-
ries of justices of the peace was unconstitutional, the California Su-
preme Court then held that that decision should not apply to past ac-
tions taken under the old law. When a justice of the peace who had
been paid at the now unconstitutional rate brought suit to be paid un-
der the new rule, the court said that “[t]he understanding of the law
prevailing at the time of the settlement of a contract, although erro-
neous, will govern.”46 The court made its decision non-retroactive be-
cause to do otherwise “would lead to the most mischievous conse-
quences” and put the community in the “miserable condition” of
never knowing when their affairs might be overturned by a new judi-
cial rule.47
California courts showed the same concern for consistency and
stability of official decisions in their use of the de facto officer doc-
trine at the beginning of this century. In upholding the acts of trustees
who were not properly appointed to office, the California Supreme
Court held in Town of Susanville v. Long that the acts of an officer de
facto are “as valid and binding” as if he were an officer de jure.48 The
court held that expecting third parties to investigate the intricacies of
every officer’s title to office before accepting their official decisions
would “lead to endless confusion.”49 California appellate courts fol-
lowed the state Supreme Court’s lead and invoked the de facto officer
doctrine in the following years in two other cases.50
45. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441 (1886).
46. Cooley v. County of Calaveras, 121 Cal. 482, 486 (1898).
47. Id.
48. Town of Susanville v. Long, 144 Cal. 362, 365 (1904).
49. Id.
50. See Oakland Paving Co. v. Donovan, 19 Cal. App. 488 (1912); People v. Elkus, 59 Cal.
App. 396, 407 (1922).
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Although California courts were using the de facto officer doc-
trine around the turn of the century, it was not until well into the
Twentieth century that Blackstone’s philosophy began to yield to
John Austin’s philosophy in the United States Supreme Court. Austin
maintained that judges “do something more than discover the law;
they make it.”51 This philosophy leads to the conclusion that “rules
which are later overruled are not erased, but are as an existing judi-
cial fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided under
it are not to be disturbed.”52 This shift from retroactivity and toward
prospectivity was motivated by practical, not just philosophical, con-
cerns. The reliance interests of those who have lived according to a
later-overturned rule of law make it difficult to pretend that such a
rule never existed.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the option of
prospective application of a judicial decision in the 1932 case Great
Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.53 In that case, the
Supreme Court did not apply its own rule prospectively, but upheld
the Supreme Court of Montana’s decision to apply a commission de-
cision solely prospectively, thus allowing the state government to
avoid paying a refund to shippers who had paid at rates that were
later declared invalid. Although the United States Supreme Court
noted that states had always had the right to apply decisions only pro-
spectively, 54 this was the first time the Supreme Court specifically ac-
knowledged that a state is not required to follow common law and
Supreme Court precedent in the realm of retroactivity and “may
make a choice for itself between the principles of forward operation
and that of relation backward.”55 The Court’s rationale for allowing
51. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 624 (1965).
52. Id. (explaining, "Austin maintained that judges do in fact do something more than dis-
cover the law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, in-
definite or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of the
law. Implicit in such an approach is the admission when a case is overruled that the earlier deci-
sion was wrongly decided. However, rather than being erased by the later overruling decision it
is considered as an existing judicial fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided
under it are not to be disturbed.").
53. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
54. Id. at 364 (stating, "[a state] may say that decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. . . . [N]ever has doubt been ex-
pressed that it may so treat them if it pleases.").
55. Id. (stating, "A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a
choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward"); cf.
McKesson Co. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)(listing both
retrospective and prospective state tax repayment schemes upheld by the Court.).
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prospective application of judicial decisions was that it is sometimes
necessary in order to avoid “injustice and hardship” to those who had
relied on the old rule.56
Having recognized non-retroactivity as a legitimate option for
state courts, the United States Supreme Court then exercised that op-
tion in 1940 in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank.
By allowing the state not to pay bonds which had been cancelled, but
whose cancellation had later been deemed unconstitutional, the
Court recognized that “the past cannot always be erased by a new ju-
dicial declaration” and that “an all-inclusive statement of a principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”57 The Court
continued to move away from the doctrine of retroactivity by declar-
ing in 1956 that “[w]e should not indulge in the fiction that the law
now announced has always been the law.”58
In Linkletter v. Walker in 1965 the United States Supreme Court
again referred to the “hardship” that could fall on those who relied on
the state of the law before a new judicial decision.59 The court specifi-
cally addressed the common law issue by saying that “[t]he Blacksto-
nian view . . . was out of tune with actuality.” 60 Until Linkletter, the
Supreme Court had recognized only that non-retroactivity is an op-
tion, but had not set out guidelines for how to decide whether to ap-
ply a new rule retroactively or non-retroactively. In Linkletter, the
Court set out a framework for making this decision, saying: “[W]e
must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.”61
The United States Supreme Court and all levels of California courts
have since utilized these three factors as an informal guide to their
retroactivity decisions.
In Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court restated the Linkletter
factors and formed them into a tripartite test.62 The Court held that, in
determining whether to apply a new rule retroactively, a court must
56. Great Northern, 287 U.S. at 364.
57. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
58. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956).
59. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 625 (1965) (quoting Great Northern, 287 U.S. at
364).
60. Id. at 624. "[T]he Blackstonian view . . .was out of tune with actuality largely because
judicial repeal ofttime did 'work hardship to those who (had) trusted its existence.'" (quoting
Cardozo, Address to the N.Y. Bar Assn., 55 Rep.N.Y. State Bar Assn. 263, 296—297 (1932)).
61. Id. at 629.
62. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
032204 GRENFELL.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
258 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 14.1
look at “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old stan-
dards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroac-
tive application of the new standards.”63 The Court then grouped
these factors together to create the second prong of a different tripar-
tite test in Chevron Oil v. Huson in 1971.64 This new test first under-
took the threshold question of whether a new rule was being created,
then looked at the three factors already described, and finally
weighed them to determine whether “substantial inequitable results”
would occur if the rule were applied retroactively.65 However, the Su-
preme Court never embraced this test strongly. Just two years later, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court espoused the importance of non-
retroactivity for protecting reliance interests, but did not mention the
other two Chevron Oil factors.66
Even as the United States Supreme Court was formulating these
tests and embracing non-retroactivity, the California Supreme Court
seemed to take a step back toward following common law with lim-
ited exceptions for very specific reliance interests. In a 1957 decision,
the California Supreme Court restated the common law, saying that
overruled decisions never were the law.67 It then noted that an excep-
tion to this rule is recognized when “contracts have been made or
property rights acquired.” 68 Since the parties in that case had not ac-
63. Id.
64. Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
65. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 108 (1971) (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
706 (1969)). "First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
law . . .; Second, . . . 'we must weight the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will
further or retard its operation' . . .; Finally, . . .where a decision of this court could produce sub-
stantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding
the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Id. at 106-08 (citations omitted).
66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 203 (1973) ("It is well established that reliance in-
terests weigh heavily in the shaping of an appropriate equitable remedy.").
67. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 680-81 (1957) ("It is the general rule
that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in
its operation and that the effect is not that the former decision was bad law but that it never was
the law.")
68. Id. at 680-81
It is the general rule that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a for-
mer decision is retrospective in its operation and that the effect is not that the former
decision was bad law but that it never was the law. A well-recognized exception to this
general rule is that, where a constitutional provision or statute has received a given
construction by a court of last resort and contracts have been made or property rights
acquired under and in accordance with its decision, such contracts will not be invali-
dated nor will vested rights acquired under the decision be impaired by a change of
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quired any such rights, the court held that the exception was not rele-
vant and thus applied its decision retroactively. California continued
to pay homage to common law by repeating, in 1989, that the “gen-
eral rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic in
our legal tradition.”69 It again recognized an exception to that rule in
the “compelling” reliance interests of a party who “has acquired a
vested right or entered into a contract based on the former rule.”70
Because no such interests arose in the case, the court applied its rul-
ing retroactively.
Despite this slip away from non-retroactivity, the court made its
most renowned use of the de facto officer doctrine during this period.
In Plan for Bunker Hill v. Henry Goldman, a party unhappy with a
commission decision challenged the commissioner’s right to office be-
cause he was not a resident of the requisite county when he took of-
fice.71 The plaintiff argued that because this commissioner’s vote had
been the deciding one and he was not a valid commissioner, the
commission decision was not valid. The court held that he was a de
facto member of the commission, so collateral attacks on his actions
were impermissible.72 The office itself was valid, so his actions within
that office could not be challenged.
Around the time of the California Supreme Court’s use of the de
facto officer doctrine in Bunker Hill, the United States Supreme
Court employed the doctrine in Glidden v. Zdanock,73 an Article III
violation case, and in Buckley v. Valeo,74 an Appointments Clause
violation case. In the first, the Court gave de facto validity to the deci-
sions of a supposed Article III panel that consisted illegally of non-
Article III judges.75 In Buckley, the Court held that the Election
Commission’s appointment structure violated the Appointments
construction adopted in subsequent decision. Under those circumstances it has been
the rule to give prospective, and not retrospective, effect to the later decision. Id.
69. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp, 48 Cal. 3d 973, 978 (1989).
70. Id. at 989.
71. Plan for Bunker Hill v. Henry Goldman, 61 Cal. 2d 21 (1964).
72. Id. at 42 ("The right of a de facto officer to an office cannot be collaterally attacked.").
73. Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
75. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 535. "[I]n other circumstances involving judicial authority this
Court has described it as well settled 'that where there is an office to be filled and one, acting
under color of authority, fills the office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an offi-
cer de facto, and binding upon the public.' The rule is founded upon an obviously sound policy
of preventing litigants from abiding the outcome of a lawsuit and then overturning it if adverse
upon a technicality of which they were previously aware." (quoting McDowell v. United States,
159 U.S. 596, 602 (1895)).
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Clause, but nonetheless gave the commission’s decisions “de facto va-
lidity.”76 Not only did the United States Supreme Court validate all
past actions of the commission, it also put a stay on its holding of un-
constitutionality so that the commission could continue to act until
Congress had time to remedy the Appointments Clause violation.
The United States Supreme Court continued this trend of letting
past actions stand unchallenged by using its Chevron Oil tripartite test
in two plurality decisions in 198277 and 1990.78 However, the Court
then began looking more favorably at retroactivity again and declared
that any decision which had already been applied to the parties be-
fore it should automatically apply to all similarly situated parties who
had not already received a final judgment. 79
Even though Buckley had upheld past actions of a commission
despite an Appointments Clause violation in 1976, twenty years later
the United States Supreme Court decided that such a violation de-
manded retroactive relief. In Ryder v. United States, a 1995 decision,
the United States Supreme Court rejected both Chevron Oil and the
de facto officer doctrine by deciding to apply its decision retroac-
tively.80 In that case, a court had acted as an Article III court even
though two of its three members had been appointed by an agency
rather than an executive. The Court held that the Article III court’s
composition violated the Appointments Clause. Because there had
been a “trespass upon the executive power of appointment”81 and be-
cause that power serves the important purpose of being a “bulwark
against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another
branch,”82 the reliance concerns of the de facto officer doctrine and of
76. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142 (1976).
77. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
78. American Trucking v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
79. See Beam Distilling v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991) (stating that, "[o]nce retroac-
tive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all other who might seek
its prospective application. . . . [W]hen the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judi-
cata."); see also Harper v. Virginia Board of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (explaining that,
"[w]hen this court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling
interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our an-
nouncement of the rule").
80. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1995) (observing that, "whatever the con-
tinuing validity of [Chevron Oil] after [Harper], there is not the sort of grave disruption or ineq-
uity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring that doctrine
into play.").
81. Id. at 182 (quoting McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596,598 (1895)).
82. Id.
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Chevron Oil were not important enough to overcome the need for
retroactive relief. It is important to note that this decision was not
simply an anomalous departure from Buckley; the United States Su-
preme Court made a similar holding using similar reasoning in 2003.83
California, however, has not followed the United States Supreme
Court in this recent trend towards retroactivity. In the past few dec-
ades the California Supreme Court has continued to embrace Sto-
vall’s three-factor test when making non-retroactive decisions.84 The
court has also expanded beyond the Stovall factors of reliance, pur-
pose, and administration of justice to consider the nature of the
change.85 In some recent non-retroactive cases, the court did not
enumerate all of these factors but referred simply to “compelling rea-
sons of fairness and public policy.”86
D. The California Court’s Analysis
California courts most often take the following approach when
deciding whether to make a decision retroactive: First the court must
make the threshold determination of whether a new rule of law has
been established.87 If there is a new rule, then the court must deter-
mine whether “fairness and public policy”88 dictate that its decision be
applied non-retroactively. In determining the dictates of fairness and
public policy, the court is attempting to avoid “injustice and hard-
83. Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).
84. Donaldson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 38 (1983) (holding that "the California
courts define retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based on Stovall v
Denno"); see also People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 401 (1984) (holding that "California courts
decide whether to make such an exception by weighing the three factors summarized in Stovall
v. Denno").
85. Woods v Young, 53 Cal. 3d 315, 330 (1991) (holding that "[p]articular considerations
relevant to the retroactivity determination include the reasonableness of the parties' reliance on
the former rule, the nature of the change as substantive or procedural, retroactivity's effect on
the administration of justice, and the purposes to be served by the new rule.") (citations omit-
ted).
86. See Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 372 (2002) (holding that "consid-
erations of fairness and public policy may require that a decision be given only prospective ap-
plication"); see also Adoption of Kelsey v. Rickie M., 1 Cal.4th 816, 851 (1992) (recognizing that
exceptions to the rule of retroactivity may sometimes be justified for "compelling reasons of
fairness and public policy").; see also Buttram v. Fiberglas Corp 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 532 (1997)
(stating that "it may be unfair to change the rules of the game in the middle of a contest").
87. Donaldson, 35 Cal. 3d at 36.
88. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp, 48 Cal. 3d 973 (1989); Rae-Venter, 29 Cal. 4th at 372
(2002).
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ship” 89 to those who reasonably relied on the old rule,90 to preserve
the orderliness of society and to prevent the chaos of constant appeals
of official decisions.91 In order to evaluate these concerns, the court
examines (1) the reasonableness of parties’ reliance on the old rule;
(2) the nature of the change and purposes served by the new rule; and
(3) the effect that retroactivity will have on the administration of jus-
tice.92 These factors help the court determine whether a non-
retroactive application would make more sense in terms of individual
fairness and societal order.
1. New Rule of Law
As discussed above, before proceeding with a retroactivity analy-
sis the California Supreme Court must first make a “threshold” de-
termination that its ruling will establish a “new standard or a new rule
of law.”93 A decision that represents a “clear break with the past”94 or
that “disapproves a practice this Court has arguably sanctioned in
prior cases” will be considered a new rule.95
The California Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled that the
California Coastal Commission is constitutional, so a new ruling of
unconstitutionality would not be a direct turnaround. However, in
twenty-seven years of frequent litigation against the Commission, the
constitutionality of the Commission’s appointment structure has
89. Great Northern Ry. Co.. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932);
Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
90. Great Northern, 287 U.S. at 364; Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107; Cipriano, 395 U.S. 701.
91. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). ("'The de facto doctrine springs from
the fear of the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every ac-
tion taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to protect
the public by enduring the orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in
title to office.'" (quoting 63A Am.Jur.2d, Pub. Officers and Employees § 578, pp. 1080-1081
(1984)).
92. See Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 372 (2002) (stating that, "Par-
ticular considerations relevant to the retroactivity determination include the reasonableness of
the parties' reliance on the former rule, the nature of the change as substantive or procedural,
retroactivity's effect on the administration of justice, and the purposes to be served by the new
rule" (quoting Woods v. Young, 53 Cal. 3d 315, 339 (1991))); see also Newman v. Emerson Ra-
dio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 983 (1989) ("A court may decline to follow the standard rule when
retroactive application of a decision would raise substantial concerns about the effects of the
new rule on the general administration of justice, or would unfairly undermine the reasonable
reliance of parties on the previously existing state of the law. In other words, courts have looked
to the 'hardships' imposed on parties by full retroactivity, permitting an exception only when
the circumstances of a case draw it apart from the usual run of cases.").
93. Donaldson v. Super. Ct., 35 Cal. 3d 24, 36 (1983).
94. Id. at 37 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1964)).
95. Id.
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never been challenged. Thus, California courts arguably have sanc-
tioned the Commission’s validity as an executive agency. If the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upholds the court of appeals’ ruling of uncon-
stitutionality, it will consider that to be a new rule and will go on to
consider the other factors listed above.
2. Reliance
The interests of parties who reasonably relied on an old rule are
probably the most important factor in the retroactivity decision. Con-
cern for “hardship” on those who reasonably relied was one of the
first reasons that the United States Supreme Court allowed non-
retroactivity, 96 and it has continued to be a major concern of the
Court. 97 In Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court found the petitioner’s
reliance interests to be overriding. Petitioner had relied on the cur-
rent state of the law which allowed him more than a year in which to
bring his suit. Unexpectedly, the United States Supreme Court made
a new rule that changed the applicable law so that the statute of limi-
tations was only one year long and petitioner’s claim would be barred.
The court pointed out that “[t]he most [petitioner] could do was rely
on the law as it then was” and it would be unfair to conclude that he
had “waived” his rights.98
Although California does not couch its own concerns about ret-
roactivity in terms of hardship, it shares the United States Supreme
Court’s view that changing the rules after the game has been played
might be unfair to those who had no reason to suspect that the rules
might change. In 1997, the California Supreme Court reasoned that it
may be “unfair” to “substantially modif[y] a legal doctrine on which
many persons may have reasonably relied.”99 In that decision, the
California Supreme Court blocked parties from bringing torts claims
based on a new definition of joint and several liability, holding that
the old definition would be valid for all claims arising before their
ruling. In a different case in 2002, the California Supreme Court
changed the legal definition of what comprises a successful appeal.
The petitioner before the court had reasonably relied on the previous
96. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)
(explaining that a new rule may be non-retroactive "whenever injustice and hardship will
thereby be averted").
97. See, American Trucking v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 169 (1990) (explaining that, in civil
cases, non-retroactivity is often used for the purpose of avoiding "injustice or hardship to civil
litigants who have justifiably relied on prior law.").
98. Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971).
99. Buttram v. Fiberglas Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 532 (1997).
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definition when he brought his appeal, so the court held that it would
be unfair to apply the new definition to him and made its ruling non-
retroactive.100
Reliance on judicial definitions is generally an important factor
in deciding whether to make a decision non-retroactive. But reliance
on property or contract rights comprises a particularly “compelling”
subcategory of reliance interest.101 When these rights have been ac-
quired under the old rule, California courts are very “reluctant to ap-
ply [their] decisions retroactively.”102 The California Supreme Court
has stated that when “contracts have been made or property rights
acquired . . . it has been the rule to give prospective, and not retro-
spective, effect to the later decision.”103 One California court of ap-
peals has taken this argument to the extreme holding that not only
are contract and property rights a very important interest, but also
they are the only valid interest so far as retroactivity is concerned.
That court held that if no such rights have vested in the parties, then
there is no reason for non-retroactivity. 104
The California Coastal Commission decisions currently being
appealed in reaction to the court of appeals ruling are (1) objections
to permitting decisions cease and desist orders and (2) offers to dedi-
cate easements. All of these involve property rights, and therefore fall
into the category of especially protected reliance interests. The
United States Supreme Court pointed out the importance of the reli-
ance interests of property owners with permits and offers to dedicate
from the Commission when it held that its ruling of unconstitutional-
ity in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission should not be retroac-
tive.105 The Commission decisions currently pending are being brought
by the recipients of the permits, but a retroactive decision would open
up the possibility that neighbors of people who received permits from
the Commission could challenge those decisions. This could substan-
tially impact property owners who had relied on Commission deci-
sions. The reliance factor, possibly the most important factor in the
100. Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 372 (2002).
101. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 989 (1989); see also Cooley v. County
of Calaveras, 121 Cal. 482, 485 (1898). (explaining that, "no subsequent decision of a court can
create a mistake and annul a previous contract which was legal and valid when made").
102. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 989.
103. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 680 (1957).
104. See, Cummings v. Morez, 42 Cal. App. 3d 66, 74 (1974) (stating that, "no vested rights
hav[e] attached to any of the parties").
105. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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California Supreme Court decision, will weigh heavily against a retro-
active decision in the MFS case.
3. Purpose of New Rule
The California Supreme Court will also consider the purpose of
the new rule106 and whether retroactive application will further this
purpose. New rules meant to provide additional protection to parties
are often considered equally important for past and future litigants
and therefore are applied retroactively. New rules that make substan-
tive changes in the law are also considered too important to be tem-
porally limited and are more likely to be made retroactive than those
that make only procedural changes. Often, new procedural rules are
meant to deter certain behaviors, and past occurrences of that be-
havior cannot be changed. Therefore, retroactive application would
not have the desired effect, and the new rule is made non-retroactive.
However, if a procedural change would preclude parties from any
chance at relief, that change will sometimes be applied non-
retroactively.107
New torts rules have been considered to impart protections
whose importance outweighs reliance interests for those who assumed
no such protections existed. For this reason, California courts almost
always apply new torts rules retroactively.108 In these cases, the new
ruling gave new protections for plaintiffs in tort actions. The purpose
of additional protection would be furthered for future as well as for
past parties. The interests of those who relied on an old rule were not
important compared to the important protections to be afforded
those who were injured.
Just as in new torts rules, new criminal laws are often meant to
expand “procedural protections” for the benefit of the defendant.109
The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that expanded pro-
cedural protections are important enough to warrant a “per se rule of
106. Woods v. Young, 53 Cal. 3d 315, 330 (1991).
107. Id. ("'Retroactive application of an unforeseeable procedural change is disfavored
when such application would deprive a litigant of "any remedy whatsoever'" (quoting Chevron
Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971))).
108. See Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 981-82 (1989) (observing that,
"[w]ith few exceptions and even after expressly considering suggestions to the contrary, Califor-
nia courts have consistently applied tort decision retroactively even when those decisions de-
clared new causes of action or expanded the scope of existing torts in ways defendants could not
have anticipated prior to our decision").
109. American Trucking v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 169 (1990) (distinguishing the importance of
retroactivity in criminal procedural protections from the lesser interest of injustice or hardship
to civil litigants).
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retroactivity.”110 In Robinson v. Neal, the United States Supreme
Court held that a new rule protecting a defendant’s right not to stand
trial twice for the same crime was such an important protection that it
should be applicable to both past and future actions. The Court thus
made its decision retroactive.111
In other cases, courts have held that retroactivity will not further
the purpose of new procedural protections. The Supreme Court rea-
soned in Linkletter that the purpose of rules excluding improperly
collected evidence is to deter lawless police action, and because the
police misconduct has already occurred, a retroactive application
would not remedy the harm already done.112 The California Supreme
Court paralleled this reasoning when it held that, because “the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule . . . is to deter illegal conduct by law en-
forcement officials, exclusion of evidence seized prior to the an-
nouncement of a decision does not further compliance with that
decision.”113
In another case in which retroactivity did not make sense, the
court articulated a new rule, changing the definition of a successful
appeal in order to deter frivolous appeals. Appeals that had already
been brought could not suddenly be deterred by retroactive applica-
tion of the new rule, so the California Supreme Court made its deci-
sion non-retroactive.114
In the MFS case, the purpose of the new rule is to prevent the
Legislature from aggrandizing power from the Executive. Although
this is a very important purpose for protecting the public in general, it
is not necessarily important for protecting the parties before the
court. There is no reason to think that a Commission with a different
appointment structure would not have served a cease and desist order
110. Id.
111. Robinson v. Neal, 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
112. Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618, 636, 639-40 (1965) ("We cannot say that this purpose
(deterring lawless police action) will be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The miscon-
duct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the
prisoners involved. . . .[T]hough the error complained of may be fundamental it is not of the na-
ture requiring us to overturn all final convictions based upon it.").
113. Donaldson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 39 (1983) (citations omitted).
114. Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 373 (2002) (observing that the pur-
pose of the statute is "to discourage frivolous, meritless, and costly appeals from the commis-
sioner's decisions to the courts. That important objective would not be served by retroactively
applying the new rule to appeals already filed and pending in the superior courts, nor will it be
compromised by prospective application of our decision. Accordingly, our holding today will be
applied prospectively only to those appeals from the commissioner's decisions and awards filed
in the trial court after the date this decision becomes final.").
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to the MFS. The court’s purpose of upholding California’s separation
of powers doctrine would not be undermined by a non-retroactive de-
cision and those subject to decisions by the unconstitutional commis-
sion would not suffer from a lack of protection, as would potential
plaintiffs in torts cases. If the California Supreme Court makes its de-
cision retroactive, the Commission’s cease and desist order against
the MFS will stand.
4. Administration of Justice.
The California Supreme Court has sometimes interpreted the
administration of justice factor to be a question of whether a retroac-
tive decision would prevent justice from being carried out. In Woods
v. Young, the court held that its decision should be non-retroactive
because a retroactive decision would block many cases from being
brought and this would not serve justice.115 More often, courts inter-
pret this factor as being a question of how retroactivity will effect the
efficient functioning of the court system. If the judicial system will be
flooded with appeals because of a retroactive decision, courts will of-
ten decide to make decisions non-retroactive.
In Stovall, the United States Supreme Court decided that making
its decision retroactive would be devastating to the administration of
justice because it would disrupt “the processing of current criminal
calendars.”116 The Court held that a criminal defendant must have
counsel present during any identification procedures, but it did not
allow previously convicted defendants who did not have counsel pre-
sent at their identification proceedings to bring suit.
In making a new rule regarding contributory negligence in 1975,
the California Supreme Court held that there were so many cases on
the same issue then pending review that it should to limit the retroac-
tivity of the new decision in order to limit the confusion in the
courts.117 In 2002, the California Supreme Court made a new rule that,
115. Woods v. Young, 53 Cal. 3d 315, 330-31 (1991) ("Concern for the administration of jus-
tice further supports prospective application. Medical malpractice is one of the more common
tort actions; therefore, we anticipate that many pending cases will be affected by our decision.
Justice is not served by barring so many actions that reasonably appeared timely when filed.").
116. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967) (noting that impact on administration of jus-
tice would be more than devastating. "At the very least, the processing of current criminal cal-
endars would be disrupted while hearings were conducted.").
117. Li v. Yellow Cab Co, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829 (1975) (holding that "in view of the very sub-
stantial number of cases involving the matter here at issue which are now pending in the trial
and appellate courts of this state, and with particular attention to considerations of reliance ap-
plicable to individual cases according to the stage of litigation which they have reached, we have
concluded that rule of limited retroactivity should obtain here.").
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similarly, would affect all appeals that had been filed in reliance on
the old rule.118 The court reasoned that this potential for disruption of
the administration of justice supported non-retroactive application of
the new rule.119 In contrast, a recent United States Supreme Court de-
cision held that a retroactive decision that would affect only seven to
ten cases then pending could be made retroactive with little risk of
great disruption to the administration of justice.120
Clearly, there is no magic number of potential appeals that con-
stitute an impermissible disruption of the administration of justice.
The possibility of a large number of appeals has been enough to push
both the California and United States Supreme Courts towards non-
retroactivity, while seven to ten cases have not been enough. In the
MFS case, the Commission has made over 100,000 permit decisions in
its twenty-seven year history. Invalidation of these decisions would
certainly constitute a devastating disruption to the California court
system. However, if retroactivity were limited by the statute of limita-
tions on Commission decisions, the number of potential appeals
would be reduced to less than twenty-three,121 thus diminishing the
concern for the administration of justice. Nonetheless, these cases
would still have an impact on the court system, so the potential im-
pairment to the administration of justice is not negligible.
IV.  LIMITING FACTORS
A. Statutes of Limitations and Res Judicata
Under common law retroactivity, the old rule was erased and all
decisions made under it could be appealed no matter when or how a
decision had been made. The United States Supreme Court noted
that “once suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or
repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door already closed.”122 Even a
new ruling of unconstitutionality cannot reopen litigation that would
118. Smith, 29 Cal.. 4th at 373 ("[Retroactive application] would stand to affect all pending
appeals from the commissioner's decisions that were filed in the superior court in reliance on
the former rule.").
119. Id.
120. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995) (stating "there is not the sort of grave
disruption or inequity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that would
bring that doctrine into play. The parties agree that the defective appointments of the civilian
judges affect only between 7 to 10 cases pending on direct review.").
121. Com. Note for Jud. Rec Ex.A, Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No.
S113466 (Cal. filed April 9, 2003).
122. Beam Distilling v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991).
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otherwise be closed by res judicata.123 California has held for many
decades that there must be a limit on how long a claim, even a consti-
tutional claim, can be justiciable.124 By 1987, a California court of ap-
peals was so sure of this limitation that it stated that “it is well settled
that the assertion of a constitutional right is subject to a reasonable
statute of limitations,”125 and then went on to say that “in California
when a court or agency acts pursuant to a statute later declared un-
constitutional, prior final proceedings based on such a statute are en-
titled to res judicata effect and are immune from collateral attack.”126
The United States Supreme Court also agrees that a party who
would otherwise be blocked by res judicata is still blocked even after a
new ruling of unconstitutionality. Such a ruling does not open the
door for claimants whose claim has already been heard, even though
a new ruling of unconstitutionality does raise a new claim. In Chicot
County v. Baxter State Bank, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a lower court’s cancellation of bonds was unconstitutional. It
held that this ruling should be retroactive and the government should
be required to pay the bonds that had been unconstitutionally can-
celled. However, the petitioner before the Court had been a party to
the lower court’s ruling canceling the bonds, so their claim was now
barred by res judicata and the government did not have to pay their
bonds.127 Even though other bondholders could claim payment under
the United States Supreme Court’s retroactive decision, the peti-
tioner was barred from such a claim by res judicata.
In denying the reassertion of a torts claim that had been decided
before a statute was declared unconstitutional, the California Su-
preme Court said that “[e]ven where there are multiple legal theories
upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to
only one claim for relief.”128 In other words, even though the claim
that the statute is now unconstitutional is a new claim that was not
available when the parties originally brought suit, those parties still
get only one opportunity to litigate over their injury.
123. See Bank of America v Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 246 Cal. App. 2d 578, 585 (1966)
(holding that, "[t]he rule appears clear in California that a judgment which was contrary to the
Constitution because it was based upon a statute later held invalid, is nevertheless res judicata in
a subsequent suit").
124. See Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 637 (1943) (stating that, "[p]ublic
policy and the interests of the litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation").
125. Miller v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1378 (1987).
126. Id. at 1379.
127. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
128. Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795 (1975).
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In the MFS case, all parties who have received a final decision
from the Commission and not made a timely appeal will be blocked
by res judicata from asserting a new claim on separation of powers
grounds. Because the statute of limitations under the California
Coastal Act is only sixty days, there existed a very small window in
which valid claims against the Commission could have been made.
B. Finality of Agency Decisions
In California, administrative agency decisions are res judicata
against future collateral attacks,129 and the statute of limitations for a
valid appeal starts to run from the date of the final agency decision.130
In striking down an adoption statute for violating the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, the California Supreme Court held
that a final decision made by an adoption agency would not be over-
turned even by a retroactive court decision.131 Similarly, California
court of appeals decisions regarding the Commission itself empha-
sized that unappealed agency decisions are immune from collateral
attack.132
129. See Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Super. Ct., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1488, 1500 (1989) (observing
that, "[t]he line of California cases previously cited dealing with the preclusive effect of a final
unreviewed administrative decision generally speak of the plaintiff being collaterally estopped
to contest issues resolved against him in the administrative proceeding"); see also Adoption of
Kelsey v. Rickie M., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 851-52 (1992) (holding that, "[o]ur decision shall therefore
have no effect in adoption proceedings in which a final judgment has been entered. Such judg-
ments cannot be challenged either directly or collaterally."); Miller v. Bd. of Med. Quality As-
surance, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1379 (1987) (explaining that "in California when a court or
agency acts pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutional, prior final proceedings based
on such a statute are entitled to res judicata effect and are immune from collateral attack").
130. See Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 9 Cal. App. 4th 592, 608 (1992)
(holding that "[f]ailure to obtain judicial review of a discretionary administrative action by a
petition for a writ of administrative mandate renders the administrative action immune from
collateral attack").
131. Adoption of Kelsey, 1 Cal. 4th at 851-52 ("Of course, even retroactive decisions gener-
ally do not extend to cases in which final judgments have already been entered. . . . Our decision
shall therefore have no effect in adoption proceedings in which a final judgment has been en-
tered. Such judgments cannot be challenged either directly or collaterally.").
132. See Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 660 (1989) (explaining that,
"[plaintiffs'] action must be reviewed by petition for writ of administrative mandate. Failure to
do so renders the administrative action immune from collateral attack."); Cal. Coastal Comm'n
v. Super. Ct., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1488, 1500 (1989) (requiring review in an administrative mandate
action when there was no theoretical or practical barrier to such review); Patrick Media Group,
Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 9 Cal. App. 4th 592, 608 (1992) (explaining that, "[f]ailure to ob-
tain judicial review of a discretionary administrative action by petition for a writ of administra-
tive mandate renders the administrative action immune from collateral attack, either by inverse
condemnation action or by any other action.").
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The California Coastal Act requires that a party file a petition
for writ of mandamus within sixty days of a Commission decision, or
else that party’s claim will be barred.133 If the party does not file a pe-
tition within those sixty days, the agency decision will then serve as
res judicata and be “immune from collateral attack.”134 California case
law on Commission decisions makes it clear that, once the statute of
limitations has run, the commission decision is “good as against the
world.” 135 The decision is valid even against a ruling of unconstitu-
tionality.
If the California Supreme Court holds that the new appointment
structure as put into effect by AB 1X is valid under the separation of
powers doctrine, then all Commission decisions made after May 22,
2003 are undeniably valid. Because final Commission decisions are
protected by res judicata and statutes of limitations, only appeals filed
within sixty days of a decision are valid. This means that, even if the
court makes its decision retroactive, only timely cases currently on
appeal would be affected. Fewer than twenty cases, including the Ma-
rine Forests Society case itself, would be affected by a retroactive
ruling of unconstitutionality in the MFS case.
V.  DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE
If the court chooses to use the de facto officer doctrine, all other
considerations of retroactivity in the MFS case would be moot. In or-
der to utilize the doctrine, the court must answer two questions in the
affirmative: (1) Does the doctrine apply in this case? (2) Do we want
to use it?
In deciding whether the de facto officer doctrine applies in the
MFS case, the main question the court will have to answer is whether
there was a de jure office to be filled. Some, but not all, jurisdictions
have held that when an office is created by an unconstitutional stat-
ute, there is no de jure office to fill so the incumbent cannot be con-
sidered a de facto officer.136 Such was the reasoning that led the
133. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30801 ("Any aggrieved person shall have a right to judicial re-
view of any decision or action of the commission by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in ac-
cordance with Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, within 60 days after the decision or
action has become final".).
134. Rossco Holdings, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 660.
135. Ojavan Investors, Inc v. California Coastal Comm'n, 26 Cal. App. 4th 516, 525 (1994).
136. See Carnegie Inst. of Med. Lab. Technique, Inc. v. Approving Auth. for Sch. for
Training Med. Lab. Technologists, N.E.2d 225, 228 (1965) (holding that members of an Ap-
proving Authority for Schools for Training Medical Laboratory Technologists were not de facto
officers when a bill involving their approval of a school was a nullity). But see Matter of Stock-
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United States Supreme Court to reject the de facto officer doctrine in
Norton v. Shelby in 1898. In that case, the Court held that because the
very creation of the commission was unconstitutional, the commission
never existed as a valid office.
Nevertheless, after nearly 100 years of careful consideration, the
same Court passed over the de jure office problem without so much as
a comment in Buckley. The facts in Buckley were very similar to the
facts in the MFS case. Congress, not by the president, appointed four
of the six members of the election commission, even thought it was
executive agency. The Court held that this violated the Appointments
Clause but then not only granted de facto validity to the Commis-
sion’s past acts, but also allowed the Commission to continue func-
tioning for thirty days while Congress found a way to remedy the
violation.137
In a more recent case involving an Appointments Clause viola-
tion, the United States Supreme Court held that the purpose of the
Appointment Clause is so important that a petitioner’s right to chal-
lenge a violation should not simply be waived via the de facto officer
doctrine.138 The Court has also reached conflicting decisions about the
appropriateness of the de facto doctrine for Article III violations. In
Glidden, the Court granted de facto authority to the decisions of non-
Article III judges.139 But in Nguyen, the Court concluded that a panel
consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV judge was such
well, 622 P.2d 910, 913 (Div. 1 1981) ("Until a statute has been declared unconstitutional, an
officer acting under the statute possesses such color of title as to render him an officer de
facto.").
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (ordering a, "stay, for a period not to exceed
30 days, (of) the Court's judgment insofar as it affects the authority of the Commission to exer-
cise the duties and powers granted it under the Act. This limited stay will afford Congress an
opportunity to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement mecha-
nisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sustains, allowing the pres-
ent Commission in the interim to function de facto in accordance with the substantive provisions
of the Act.").
138. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (explaining that, "[t]he [Appoint-
ments] Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another
branch, but it is more: it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's structural integrity by
preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.'" (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868, 878 (1991))).
139. Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530, 535 (1962) ("[I]n other circumstances involving
judicial authority this Court has described it as well settled 'that where there is an office to be
filled and one, acting under color of authority, fills the office and discharges its duties, his ac-
tions are those of an officer de facto, and binding upon the public.' The rule is founded upon an
obviously sound policy of preventing litigants from abiding the outcome of a lawsuit and then
overturning it if adverse upon a technicality of which they were previously aware." (quoting
McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 602 (1895))).
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a grave violation that the panel’s decision should not be granted de
facto validity.140
One court of appeals overlooked the de jure office requirement
and granted de facto validity to the past actions of city councilors even
though the charter establishing the City Council was unconstitu-
tional.141 Other than this, all other California cases using the de facto
officer doctrine have not had to resolve the issue of whether there is a
de jure office to fill because they dealt with a valid office and a defec-
tive officer.142
United States Supreme Court precedent is conflicted on the issue
of whether the de facto officer doctrine is applicable when the statute
creating the office is unconstitutional. California precedent is sparse,
but indicates that the court might still find the doctrine applicable.
If the California Supreme Court decides that the de facto officer
doctrine is applicable, it must then decide whether it wants to employ
it. Although the doctrine could apply to any court ruling invalidating
the decisions of a government official, courts have chosen not to ap-
ply it even when it was a viable option. They have chosen instead to
use a non-retroactivity analysis. For example, the United States Su-
preme Court in Northern Pipeline quoted Buckley in order to grant a
stay of its holding that a court was unconstitutional, but did not refer
to Buckley’s use of the de facto officer doctrine.143 Instead, the Court
used its Chevron Oil test to make the decision non-retroactive. In
Lemon, the Court recognized the importance of reliance interests of
those who relied on seemingly legal official decisions, but it invoked
140. Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (2003) (stating that, "Congress' decision
to preserve theArt. III character of the courts of appeals is more than a trivial concern)."
141. See People v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 407 (1922) (stating that '[h]aving been elected
and acting under color of legal authority, the defendants were and are de facto officers whose
official acts, within the scope of their authority as defined by the charter, are and will continue
to be valid").
142. See Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21 (1964) (holding that the agency was valid but
one commissioner was not a resident of the requisite county when he took office); Susanville v.
Long, 144 Cal. 362 (1904) (holding that the trustees were not properly appointed); Oakland
Paving Co. v. Donovan, 19 Cal. App. 488 (1912) (holding that the replacement superintendent
of streets was appointed by the board of public works instead of by the mayor).
143. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) ("It is
plain that Congress' broad grant of judicial power to non-Article III bankruptcy judges presents
an unprecedented question of interpretation of Article III. It is equally plain that retroactive
application would not further the operation of our holding, and would surely visit substantial
injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in
the bankruptcy courts. We hold, therefore, that our decision today shall apply only prospec-
tively.").
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the principles of non-retroactivity rather than the de facto officer doc-
trine in validating the past actions of those officers.144
California has consistently held that agency decisions, even when
made pursuant to a statute later ruled unconstitutional, are final deci-
sions and are protected by res judicata. California courts have often
used the non-retroactivity doctrine to preserve past agency deci-
sions,and have not used the de facto officer doctrine. For example, in
Miller v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, the California Supreme
Court held that although the agency had acted according to an uncon-
stitutional statute, its prior decisions were immune from collateral at-
tack. In upholding past decisions, the court never mentioned the de
facto officer doctrine.145 In Adoption of Kelsey, the California Su-
preme Court preserved past actions of the agency, but never referred
to the de facto officer doctrine.146
Despite the striking similarity between the facts in Buckley and
the facts in this case, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court
will choose to use the de facto officer doctrine. The reasons for the de
facto officer doctrine are very similar to the reasons for non-
retroactivity. In deciding whether non-retroactivity is appropriate, the
court also decides whether the de facto officer doctrine is appropriate.
However, there is a somewhat rigorous method for deciding whether
to use the retroactivity doctrine, while there is very little method to
deciding whether to use the de facto officer doctrine. Therefore,
courts feel more justified in making a decision non-retroactive, and
the effect is the same. This helps explain why the de facto officer doc-
trine has been used so sparingly, especially by the California Supreme
Court.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Although the de facto officer doctrine is probably applicable and
provides a clean and easy solution to the court’s retroactivity di-
lemma, it is unlikely that the court will use the doctrine. Courts have
avoided that course of action, preferring instead to employ the more
developed analysis of retroactivity. It is thus unlikely that the Califor-
144. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 209 (1973). "[S]tate officials and those with whom
they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute, enacted in good faith and by
no means plainly unlawful."
145. Miller v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1379 (1987) (holding
that, "an administrative agency does not act without fundamental jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction when it acts pursuant to the authority of a statute later declared unconstitutional").
146. Adoption of Kelsey v Rickie M., 1 Cal. 4th 816 (1992).
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nia Supreme Court will use the de facto officer doctrine in the MFS
case for only the second time in eighty years. The court will look in-
stead to the more abundant case law on retroactivity.
Although the retroactivity doctrine is more developed than the
de facto officer doctrine, its history is inconsistent. In the past decade,
United States Supreme Court decisions have shown a preference for
retroactivity, limited by res judicata and statutes of limitations. Cali-
fornia courts have continued to follow the outdated United States
Supreme Court practice of balancing reliance interests, the purpose of
the new rule, and the effect on administration of justice against the
common law presumption of retroactivity of judicial decisions. In the
MFS case, the substantial reliance concerns of parties who have ac-
quired the right to develop their property through Commission deci-
sions, combined with the lack of a direct injury to be remedied by the
new rule and the potential impact on the administration of justice,
weigh heavily in favor of non-retroactivity.
